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Abstract: The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 escalated from Southeast Asia and landed in Northeast 
Asia. However, in the process of recovery from the crisis, two countries took the opposite approaches. 
The  Korean  Government  adopted  the  plans  from  the  IMF  and  received  a  rescue  fund,  but  the 
Malaysian Government adopted the independent recovery plans. With strong fundamentals, a generally 
liberal and continued integration approach into the global market-Mahathir's limited capital controls 
notwithstanding-Malaysia would probably see its economic recovery in relative good health again, 
even if with the 2-digit growth of the last decade. Therefore, this Malaysian Government's approach 
shows the importance of the self-supporting economy when confronting with the WTO's economic 
system and financial crisis. This study aims to evaluate after the financial crisis of the Korean economy 
with a special emphasis on the Korean government's structural reform efforts under the IMF program 
and Malaysia's capital control policy, it points out many issues of the Korean economy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The  1997  Asian  economic  crisis  started  in 
Southeast  Asian  countries  and  swept  over  Northeast 
ones only after several months. While each country had 
a  different  economic  structure  and  as  a  result,  took 
different  economic  measures  to  cope  with  the  crisis, 
one  of  the  common  factors  it  experienced  was  the 
depreciation  of  the  currency  and  the  depressed  stock 
market. The instability in the financial sector affected 
the object economy; international trade was disturbed, 
the  unemployment  rate  increased,  interest  rate  hiked 
and investments plunged. Measures had to be taken to 
improve  the  overall  economic  system  as  depression 
became uncontrollably serious and prolonged. 
  Korea  also  experienced  the  so-called  ‘IMF 
Coldwaves’ from the end of November 1997. Following 
a harsh stock market collapse, interest rate increased to 
about 30%. Abrupt depreciation of Korean Won (₩) 
drained  the  foreign  exchange  reserves  of  Korea  and 
accelerated  the  economic  crisis.  Korea's  Sovereign 
credit rating was degraded to non-investment, a sharp 
fall  by  six  grades
[1].  At  last,  the  Korean  government 
asked  the  IMF  for  relief  financing  and  took  massive 
structural reshuffle as the IMF requested
[2].   
  On  the  other  hand,  Malaysia  experienced  the 
financial crisis but the toil Malaysians experienced and 
countermeasures for the crisis were quite different from 
those  of  Korea.  Like  other  South  Asian  countries, 
Malaysia  also  experienced  stagnant  economic  growth, 
unstable prices, shrinking local spending and exports and 
a decline in capital and public investments. Unlike Korea, 
however,  Malaysia  reacted  to  such  financial  crisis  by 
adopting  a  strong  capital  control  policy  and  the  fixed 
exchange rate system in order to stabilize exchange rates 
and boost financial sectors. The country recorded 5.8% 
and 8.5% economic growth rates in 1999 and in 2000 
respectively and its economy became  stabilized  as the 
current account balance turned to red
[3, 4]. Call rate also 
sharply  decreased  from  7.75%  in  September  1989  to 
3.19% in August 1999 and price index held steady after 
the capital control policy was implemented. 
  Korea  and  Malaysia  showed  similarities  in  the 
process  of  financial  crisis  but  clear  differences  in 
counter economic measures to overcome the crisis. This 
study will focus on comparing the background which 
made  two  countries  implement  different  economic 
policies  and  the  results  of  such  policies.  It  will  also 
make an effort to find out the lessons that the economic 
policies of Malaysia could imply for the restructuring of 
the Korean financial industry and corporations. 
 
COUNTERMEASURES FOR THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
     
  The Financial Crisis of South East Asian countries, 
which  were  initiated  in  Thailand  in  June  1997,  was 
treated  with  two  different  countermeasures.  First, 
countries like Korea and Thailand received IMF rescue 
financing and accepted a so-called global standard, with 
which capital and financial markets are open. Second, 
countries like Malaysia refused to liberalize and open 
its capital and financial markets and took capital control 
measures as they believed that the abrupt movement of 
short-term money caused the crisis. Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (9): 1315-1320, 2005 
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Table 1:  Countermeasures of countries and IMF supports 
    IMF Support & Policy Intervention 
    ------------------------------------------ 
    Support  Refusal to Support 
Accepting  Positive  Korea  Singapore 
IMF      Thailand  Malaysia 
  Passive  Indonesia 
 
Table 2:  Status of foreign exchange of three countries (as end of 
1997) 
  Malaysia  Korea  Thailand 
Balance of Budget  2.4  -0.2  -1.0 
(to GDP %) 
Foreign Exchange  217.0  89.0  90.0 
Holding (US$100 million) 
The number of Month  3.4  0.70  1.8 
for Import meeting 
Foreign Debt  447.0  1, 544  934.0 
(US$100 million) 
Corporate Sector  40.5  88.3  74.0 
Short-term Debts  28.5  44.3  37.3 
Foreign Debts'GDP (%)  62.7  58.7  92.2 
Foreign Debts / Export (%)  20.4  111.4  164.7 
Foreign Currency Holding  170.0  30.0  80.0 
/ Short-term Debts (%) 
Note: 1) Foreign exchange holding of Korea (US$8. 9 billion) was 
usable at hand. 2) The foreign exchange holding of Korea in 1997 
was  somewhat  different  from  US$158  billion  announced  by  the 
Korean government. But the figure in the same source was used for 
the comparison.   
Source: ABN-AMRO, 1999. Asian Market Quarterly 
 
Table 3:  Asian countries foreign exchange holdings and short-term 
debt ratios 
 
Source: Samsung Economic Research Institute (1999) 
 
  There were different economic situations in these 
countries.  Table  1  shows  those  various  measures  to 
overcome the financial crisis. 
  As  shown  in  Table  1,  these  measures  can  be 
classified as follows
[5]: 
 
*  IMF with IMF: Korea and Thailand received IMF 
help and propelled finance and corporate structural 
reshuffles as requested by the IMF. 
*  No IMF  with IMF: Indonesia received IMF help 
but didn't accomplish the IMF program because of 
the local political situation. 
*  No IMF without IMF: Malaysia refused IMF help 
and took its own policies that refused opening and 
liberalizing finance market. 
*  IMF  without  IMF:  Singapore  took  liberalized  its 
financial market without the IMF help and tried to 
prevent the financial crisis.     
 
            The  measures  taken  by  Korea  and  Malaysia 
were  different  because  each  country  differed  in 
economic structure, types of leaders and various social 
conditions at the time. Korea targeted to relieve foreign 
debts and to recover the real economy while Malaysia 
wanted to strengthen its local industrial competitiveness 
and  to  overcome  the  pressure  to  open  its  financial 
market.   
 
CAPITAL CONTROL POLICY OF MALAYSIA 
 
Background of capital control policy: The reason that 
Malaysia  took  capital  control  policy  was  that  the 
economic  situation  of  Malaysia  was  different  from 
those of other Asian countries. First, it had no problem 
in  foreign currency liquidity. Second, short-term debt 
ratio was relatively lower than other countries. Third, 
the problem of local loans was somewhat heavy.   
  First,  Malaysia  was  in  better  liquidity  condition 
than  Korea  or  Thailand,  as  shown  in  Table  2.  The 
foreign  exchange  holding  of  Malaysia  was  US$21.  7 
billion as of the end of 1997, which was a far greater 
amount than US$9 billion of Korea and Thailand. This 
amount  was  enough  to  pay  off  3-month  imports  of 
Malaysia while Korea can pay only 0.7-month import 
and  Thailand  1.8  months.  The  total  foreign  debts  of 
Malaysia were not so large and maturities of debts were 
not so pending
[6].   
  Second,  The  ratio  of  foreign  debts  to  GDP  of 
Malaysia was 62.7%, which was better than 92.2% of 
Thailand though it was somewhat worse than 58.7% of 
Korea  (Table  2)
[7].  Malaysia  had  foreign  debts  of 
US$44.  7  billion  (28.5%  of  short-term  debts)  while 
Korea US$154. 4 billion (44.3%), Thailand US$93. 4 
billion (37.3%), respectively (Table 3). 
  Malaysia’s  low  short-term  debt  ratio  meant  that 
Malaysia had much fewer possibilities for the Financial 
Crisis. That is, the total foreign debt took 20.4% of the 
total annual export amount in comparison with 111% of 
Korea  and  164%  of  Thailand.  Malaysia’s  foreign 
currency holding was 1.7 times of its short-term foreign 
debts
[8].   
  Third, Asian countries experienced sharp rises in 
local loans since the end of 1980 as the economy grows 
rapidly. In the middle of 1998, the total amount of local 
loans exceeded the total foreign debts, which eventually 
led to huge bad debts when the economy went down. 
Table  4  shows  three  countries  loan  loans  and  capital 
construction  cost  (as  of  the  middle  of  1998).  Each 
nation NPL (nonprofit loans) ratios were about 25% in 
Malaysia  and  30%  in  Korea  and  Thailand.  Capital 
construction costs of financial institutions were 22% of 
GDP in Malaysia, 30% in Korea and Thailand
[9].   
 
Capital control policy and follow-up  measures: As 
shown  above,  Malaysia  was  relatively  in  a  good 
condition in foreign exchange holding and short-term 
debts. However, bad loans began to increase. As a result, 
Malaysia tried to take a somewhat differentiated policy, 
which was capital control policy.   Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (9): 1315-1320, 2005 
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Table 4:  Local  loans  and  capital  construction  cost  of  three  Asian 
countries (unit %) 
  Malaysia  Korea  Thailand 
Local Debts (vs. GDP)  165  165  155 
Real Estate  30:40  10:15  30:40 
Loans / Mortgage Ratio  80:100  60:100  80:100 
Price Increase of Housing  -16.0  -2.0  -20.0 
(Vs. A year ago) 
NPL (Not Profit Loans)  25  30  30 
Ratio 
Capital construction cost  22  30  30 
(Vs. GDP) 
Note: Loans / Mortgage Ratio are level of 1997 
Source: J. P. Morgan 
 
Table 5: Policies implemented by Malaysia, Korea and Thailand 
   Malaysia  
 Economic   ▶ Local debt problem →  foreign debt problem  
 Situation  - Credit crisis of foreign exchange     market 
  - Foreign exchange holding was170% of short-term debts 
  - Local loans were 165% of foreign debts 
  -High loan ratio to real estates  
  Korea and Thailand 
  ▶ Foreign debt problem → Local debt problem  
   - Foreign exchange market credibility and liquidity crisis 
  - Foreign exchange holding was  30% of short-term debts 
  - GDP takes 155-165% of local loans   
  Malaysia  
  ▶ Local economic pump-priming 
  ▶ Lowering interest rates> Stable exchange rate 
  Korea and Thailand 
Policy priorities ▶ Recovering overseas credibility 
  ▶ Stable foreign exchange rate>Interest rate stability 
  Malaysia  
  ▶ Independent policy – Capital control 
  - Priority on economic boost 
  - Monetary expansion  
  - Low interest rate policy 
  -Delayed structural reform 
Policy  Korea and Thailand 
  ▶ Recovering overseas credibility 
   ▶ Stable foreign exchange rate >Interest rate stability 
Source: Samsung Economic Research Institute (1999) 
 
  The  situation  in  the  early  days  of  the  financial 
crisis in Asian countries was not so bad, but it worsened 
in 1998. Consequently, the prime minister recognized 
that Malaysia needed local economic boosting measures 
rather  than  belt-tightening  policies  of  Korea  and 
Thailand[
10]. Malaysia put priorities on pump priming 
of the economy, although structural reform was one of 
its  goals.  Different  economic  backgrounds  of  each 
country had led to different policies. Table 5 shows the 
differences of economic policies right after Malaysia, 
Korea and Thailand faced the financial crisis.   
  On the other hand, Korea puts stress on recovering 
international credibility. As a result, high interest rates 
were introduced to stabilize foreign exchange rates and 
interest  rates.  Efforts  were  also  made  to  secure 
short-term  liquidity,  foreign  debt  reduction  and 
structural reform recommended by the IMF.   
  Table  6  shows  the  main  contents  of  Malaysias 
capital control policy
[9]. First, all money flow among or 
between  foreign  accounts  should  be  made  after  the 
permission. In addition, all foreign money and money 
invested  in  securities  of  Malaysia  had  to  be  retained 
within  Malaysia,  which  allowed  foreign  investors  to 
buy Ringgit assets.   
  Second,  in  Malaysia  residents  and  non-residents 
could freely use up to 100,000 Ringgit worth of foreign 
currency, but they could spend only 10,000 worth of 
foreign  currency  per  deal  except  in  import  or  export 
transactions.  Moreover,  money  withdrawal  from 
external accounts was limited and money couldn't from 
between those accounts. In trade, Ringgit shouldn't be 
used so that Ringgit was out of international currency.   
  Third,  as  far  as  overseas  investments  were 
concerned, residents who didn't have foreign debts were 
required  to  have  permission  in  advance  for  overseas 
investments. Regulations on the international balance of 
payments  were  re-enforced;  Ringgit-based  securities 
had  to  be  transacted  through  only  authorized 
institutions;  Ringgit-based  securities  should  be 
transacted  overseas;  and  the  money  garnered  from 
selling securities held less than a year was prohibited 
from  being  exchanged  for  foreign  currency.  Foreign 
investment was allowed to move out after one year
[11].   
  These  capital  control  policies  were  designed  to 
prevent  abrupt  capital  outflow  and  foreign  exchange 
rate  hikes  when  interest  rates  were  lowered  for  an 
economic  boost.  Malaysian  government  planned  the 
following: capital control and pegged foreign exchange 
rate system → lowering interest rates → loan increase 
and relieved the burden of debts → economic recovery 
and reduced bad debts → credibility recovery among 
economic  participants.  As  such  goals  were  achieved, 
Malaysian  central  banks  lowered  the  open  market 
interest rate (central bank interest rate to commercial 
banks) to 11% in  August and 8% in September. The 
reserve  ratio  for  payments  were  also  lowered  to  8% 
(end of August) → 4% (middle of September) and loan 
margin of banks was forced to go down to 2.5% from 
4% on September 11. 
 
ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT COMPARISON 
BETWEEN KOREA AND MALAYSIA 
 
  This  year,  Asian  countries  which  experienced  an 
economic crisis at the end of 1997 are experiencing a 
distinctive economic recovery, largely thanks to those 
measures taken after the crisis. Since the end of 1998, 
foreign    exchange    market  has  been  stabilized; 
interest  Rates  have  been  lowered;  foreign  investments 
have led to stock price increases and    economic growth 
records   Korea, Thailand and Philippines recorded plus 
growth  rates  during  the  first  quarter  and  Malaysia 
recorded 10% in the 4th quarter of 1998, -1.3% at the1st 
quarter  of  1999.  In  particular,  Korea  and  Malaysia 
changed future economic growth rates to 6.5% and 4.6% 
respectively, showing economic recovery. Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (9): 1315-1320, 2005 
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Table 6: Main Contents of Capital Control Policy of Malaysia   
Classification  Before  Reform 
 General  - Free money transfer between foreign account holders  - Admission required in advance for any money flow between  
  - No limit on money flow of foreign accounts  foreign accounts 
    - Free money transfer to a resident of foreign accounts up to  
    September 30, but require permission after September 30 
    - The overseas account money source is limited to as follows n  
    Money acquired from selling securities or other assets listed in  
    Malaysia n Payments, wages, commission, interest,  dividend  
    income n Money acquired from selling foreign currency 
    - Money can be used to buy Ringget based assets in Malaysia 
Foreign exchange  - A Resident can pay up to 100,000 Ringgit to a  - A resident can freely pay 10,000 Ringgit or comparable 
regulation  non-resident. More than 100,000 Ringgit   foreign currency if it is not for the settlement of trade 
  requires other conditions    
 Overseas  - A resident without local debt can pay to a  - A resident without local debt can freely pay 10,000 Ringgit  
  nonresident for overseas investment  or comparable foreign currency to a nonresident for overseas  
    investment 
Investment  - A local firm without local debt can invest  - All residents need to have permission for more than 10,000  
  less than 10 million Ringgit a year   Ringgit payments  
Ringgit loans  - A resident can borrow less than 100,000  - No loan from a non-resident to a resident allowed 
from   Ringgit from a non-resident   
Non-resident     
Securities  - No regulation in transacting securities listed in Malaysia  - Ringgit securities should be entrusted to an  
  among residents and non-residents  authorized institution  
  - A resident can buy overseas securities from a  non-resident  - Nonresidents securities should be transacted through  
  under overseas investment regulation of Malaysia  authorized institutions 
    - Nonresidents can use foreign currency or Ringgit at 
    overseas account  
     - Money earned from selling Malaysian securities can be kept  
    at overseas accounts  When Ringgit securities are held more  
    than a year and Proceeds from the sale can be exchanged for  
    foreign currency or deposited to overseas accounts n A  
    resident should get paid with foreign currency when overseas  
    securities are sold 
Source: Adapted from information provided by the Central Bank of Malaysia 
 
Table 7:  Quarterly economic growth rates of East Asian countries   
(Unit: %)  98. 1/4  2/4  3/4  4/4  99. 1/4 
Korea  -3.6  -7.2  -6.3  -6.6  4.6 
Philippines  1.2  -0.8  -0.7  -1.9  1.2 
Thailand  -8.0  -12.3  -12.5  -5.0  0.9 
Malaysia  -3.1  -5.2  -10.9  -10.3  -1.3 
Indonesia  -4.0  -12.3  -18.4  -19.5  -10.3 
Source: Statistic of the Central Bank of each country 
 
Table 8:  Korean  economic  and  financial  trend  after  IMF  financial 
support   
  97. 12  98. 6  98. 12  99. 6 
Foreign exchange 
holding / Short-term 
debts(times)  0.31  0.96  1.22  1.89 
        (End of March) 
Dollar / Won  1, 695  1,370  1,200  1,157 
Call interest rate 
(yearly %)  35.0  14.3  6.8  4.8 
Stock price index  376  298  563  883 
Note: as of end of a month 
 
  Economic  and  financial  statistics  during  the 
overcome of the Financial Crisis shows the following: 
First, Korea achieved financial market stability, foreign 
exchange market and real economic recovery since the 
middle  of  1998.  Foreign  exchange  liquidity  has  been 
improved a lot through the  foreign exchange holding 
increase,  redemption  of  short-term  debts  (the  ratio 
between  short-term  debts/  foreign  exchange  holding: 
0.31 (97.12) → 1.89 (99.3)). Foreign exchange rate has 
shown downturn stability since early 1998 and the call 
rate went down to current 4% from 35% in 1997. The 
stock market experienced its first rise at the end of 1998 
and  another  rise  in  May  1999  to  current  883  (Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index) in June 1999 (Table 8).   
  On  the  other  hand,  the  operation  ratio  of  the 
manufacturing sector increased by 22.4% in May 1999 
from the year ago and recorded around 60% in 1998 
and 76.5% in May 1999. Exports increased to US$13 
billion for the half of 1999, 12.8% increase from the 
year  ago.  It  was  the  highest  export  amount  ever 
recorded.  As  a  result,  consumption  also  increased 
13.1% during the  first quarter of 1999 and 17.7% in 
May the same year (Table 9). 
  Second,  economic  achievement  was  shown  from 
the export sector in Malaysia, largely due to stabilized 
the foreign exchange market and exchange rate, which 
was the result of the strong capital control policy of the 
government and low interest rate policy of the central 
bank.  Malaysia’s  unique  feature  was:  pegged  foreign 
exchange rate (US$3. 8), which minimize the bad side 
of extreme depreciation; low interest rate up to 2.5% in 
June 1999 (Table 10). Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (9): 1315-1320, 2005 
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Table 9: Production and exports increase of Korean manufacturing industry 
  98. 12  99. 1  99. 2  99. 3  99. 4  99. 5  99. 6 
Production of 
manufacturing sector (%)  5.1  15.0  3.9  19.4  17.5  22.4  - 
Export (%)  -0.1  3.0  -16.8  -2.5  -4.1  1.9  12.8 
 
Table 10:  Economic and financial status of Malaysia after foreign exchange crisis   
  97. 12  98. 6  98. 12  99. 6 
Foreign exchange holding /Short-term debts (times)  1.24  1.60  3.01  3.83 (End of March) 
Ringgit / US Dollar  3.88  4.12  3.8  3.8 
Call interest rate (yearly %)  8.79  10.31  5.14  3.48 
Stock price index  594  456  586  811 
 
Table 11: Production and export increase of Malaysia 
  98. 12  99. 1  99. 2  99. 3  99. 4  99. 5 
Production of manufacturers (%)  -13.7  -17.1  4.9  4.3  4.5  - 
Exports (%)  12.3  12.0  -1.5  4.3  14.3  14.9 
 
Table 12: Economic achievement comparison between Korea and Malaysia   
  Korea  Malaysia 
Economic growth rate (%; first quarter 1999)  4.6  -1.3 
Stock price increase (%; first half 1999)  57.0  38.4 
Production increase of manufacturing (%)  22.5 (May)  4.5 (April) 
Export increase ratios (%)    12.8 (June)  14.9 (May) 
Direct foreign investment    44.6 Billion Dollars (81.4 % Increase)  5 Billion Dollars (-63 %) 
Note: Direct foreign investment is during the first half in Korea and up to end of April in Malaysia 
 
  From March 1999, exports of petroleum, gas and 
electronic products showed good signs. The production 
of  the  manufacturing  sector  showed  a  three-month 
consecutive  increase  since  February  1999.  Further, 
consumption  rapidly  recovers  for  brighter  economic 
prospects.  Imports  of  consumer  products  increased 
17.2% in April and sales tax increased 45.8%.   
  Comparing overall economic accomplishments of 
both  countries,  both  countries  are  considered  very 
positive.  In  economic  growth  rates,  Korea  showed 
better figures; Korea recorded 4.6% for the first quarter 
of 1999, more than 6% expected in 1999 and -3.8% for 
the first quarter of 1998 while Malaysia recorded 1.3%, 
2%, -3.1% respectively. The Korean stock market also 
showed  better  figures  and  direct  investment,  which 
represents  overseas  credibility,  show  good  figures  in 
Korea
[8,9].   
  However,  Korea  and  Malaysia  responded  to  the 
crises  with  different  approaches.  Therefore  it  is  very 
hard  to  judge  which  approach  or  policy  is  superior. 
Refer economic accomplishments in Table 12. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Swept  by  the  unavoidable  international  market 
force, East Asian countries experienced a severe foreign 
exchange  crisis.  Korea  and  Malaysia,  however,  took 
different ways to overcome the crisis. Korea relied on 
IMF support, which, of course, became a great help for 
economic  recovery  and  accomplishments,  while 
Malaysia  pursued  its  own  countermeasures  such  as  a 
strong  capital  control  policy  and  achieved  economic 
recovery.   
  The  most  common  reasons  for  the  foreign 
exchange  crisis  include  regionalism  frequently 
observed  all  over  the  world,  vulnerable  financial 
markets  and  inefficient  corporate  structures.  As  the 
capital  market  has  been  liberalized,  most  developing 
countries,  which  showed  instability  in  their  financial 
markets  and  did  not  have  enough  time  to  properly 
proceed corporate structural reform, have experienced 
foreign exchange crisis.   
  After  careful  analysis,  this  study  concluded  that 
although the countermeasures Korea and Malaysia took 
to overcome the crisis were different, their results were 
similar.  This  study  will  focus  on  comparing  the 
background  which  made  two  countries  implement 
different  economic  policies  and  the  results  of  such 
policies;  the  IMF-leading  policies  of  Korea  and  the 
independent recovery programs of Malaysia resulted in 
almost equal economic achievements. Korea has taken 
steps to be passively absorbed by a new trend of the 
world  economy  while  Malaysia  has  implemented  its 
own economic policies ignoring such trend.   
  In conclusion, in order to draw the best economic 
policies, it seems important to gain an insight into the 
flow of the world economy and to take advantage of it 
depending  on  the  economic  circumstances  of  each 
country.  The  capital  control  policy  taken  by  the 
Mahathir  administration  was  a  relatively  reasonable 
choice that led to two-digit economic growth rate and 
Korea  should  get  the  lessons  that  such  independent 
policies imply. 
  There  is  no  better,  absolute  policy  in  an 
ever-changing  international  economy.  Through  the 
processes  by  which  they  have  overcome  foreign 
exchange  crises,  Korea  and  Malaysia  show  how 
important it is that a country cooperates with others in Am. J. Applied Sci., 2 (9): 1315-1320, 2005 
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an interdependent economic system while fostering the 
foundation of an independent economy. 
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